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The present note revisits a result by Kim and Wong (2010) showing that any strict Nash equi-
librium of a coordination game can be supported as a long run equilibrium by properly adding
dominated strategies. We show that in the circular city model of local interactions the selection of
1
2-dominant strategies remains when adding strictly dominated strategies if interaction is \decen-
tral". Conversely, if the local interaction structure is \central" by adding properly suited dominated
strategies any equilibrium strategy of the original game can be supported as long run equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
There are many situations where people can beneﬁt from coordinating on the same action, e.g. a joint
technology standard or a common social norm, thus giving rise to coordination game with multiple strict
Nash equilibria. Traditional game theory stays however silent on the question which of these equilibria
will emerge, as no equilibrium reﬁnement concept can discard a strict Nash equilibrium.
Starting with the seminal works of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) a strand
of literature has emerged that can provide equilibrium predictions in the presence of multiple strict
Nash equilibria. The basic idea behind this approach is to consider a population of boundedly rational
agents who recurrently play a game against each other and decide upon their strategies using simple
behavioral rules, as e.g. myopic best response learning or imitation learning. Within this setting a strategy
conﬁguration is then stochastically stable or long run equilibrium if it is more diﬃcult to leave to other
states than to enter from other states by the mean of independent mistakes. For coordination games,
in a setting where everybody interacts with everybody else, this basically translates into the selection
of 1
2-dominant strategies, i.e. strategies that perform well in a world of uncertainty on the behavior of
others. The reason for the selection of 1
2-dominant strategies is that from any other state less than one
half of the population has to be shifted (to the 1
2-dominant strategy) for the 1
2-dominant convention to
be established. On the contrary, to upset the state where everybody plays the 1
2-dominant strategy more
than half of the population have to adopt a diﬀerent strategy.
In a recent paper Kim and Wong (2010) challenge the validity of this approach by adding dominated
strategies to the original game. Surprisingly, under best response learning this may change the prediction
for the long run outcome. In particular, any Nash equilibrium of the base game can be supported by
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1adding just one strategy that is dominated by all other strategies. The basic idea is that for any Nash
equilibrium of a game one can construct a dominated strategy that is such that an agent will choose
that Nash equilibrium strategy once only a “very small” fraction of her opponents choose the dominated
strategy. This essentially implies that in a (properly) extended game one agent changing to the dominated
strategy is enough to move into the basin of attraction of any Nash equilibrium strategy. Thus, by adding
dominated strategies to a game the long run prediction can be reversed in a setting where interaction is
global.
In the present note we demonstrate that this critique does not necessarily go through in Ellison’s
(1993) local interactions model where the population of agents is arranged around a circle and each
agent interacts with a subset of the population only. In particular, we show that if the original game
has a 1
2-dominant strategy then the state where all agents choose the 1
2-dominant strategy is the unique
long run equilibrium in any extended game, that is obtained by adding strictly dominated strategies
to the original game, provided that the interaction structure is suﬃciently “decentral”. The main idea
behind this result is that 1
2-dominant strategies may still spread out contagiously from an initially small
subset of the population. Thus, the number of mutations required to move into the basin of attraction
of the 1
2-dominant convention is independent of the population size. Conversely, even in the presence
of dominated strategies the eﬀect of mutations in the presence of 1
2-dominant strategies is local and
hence depends on the population size. This implies that for a suﬃciently large population the selection
of 1
2-dominant strategies remains. However, we ﬁnd that the critical population size required for the
selection of a 1
2-dominant strategy is larger in the extended game than in the original game. We exploit
this observation to show that if the population size is relatively small, meaning that interaction is rather
“central”, we can always ﬁnd an extended game such that any equilibrium strategy of the original game
is selected.
It is interesting to note that the robustness of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob’s (1993) model of global
interactions has been challenged in the following three ways: i) Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993)
themselves have argued that the low speed of convergence renders the model’s predictions irrelevant
for large populations, ii) Bergin and Lipman (1996) have shown that the model’s predictions are not
independent of the underlying model of noise, and just recently iii) Kim and Wong (2010) have argued
that the model is not robust to the addition of strictly dominated strategies. In Ellison’s (1993) model
of local interactions risk dominant strategies are able to spread out contagiously implying a high speed
of convergence for even large populations, thereby essentially challenging the ﬁrst critique. Further, Lee,
Szeidl, and Valentinyi (2003) argue that this contagious spread essentially also implies that the prediction
in a local interactions model will be independent of the underlying model of noise for a suﬃciently large
population. The present note shows that for a suﬃciently large population the local interaction model is
also robust to the addition (and thus also elimination) of strictly dominated strategies.
The remainder of the note is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents the model and discusses
the main techniques used. Section 3 spells out our main results and Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Local interaction games
We consider a population of m agents who recurrently play a symmetric two player n × n game against
each other. We denote by S the set of pure strategies. We denote by Σ the set of mixed strategies over
S and by σ(s) the probability put on the pure strategy s under a mixed strategy σ ∈ Σ. We denote the
2payoﬀ of the pure strategy s against the pure strategy s′ by u(s,s′) and against a mixed strategy σ ∈ Σ
by u(s,σ). We let
E = {s ∈ S|u(s,s) > u(s′,s) for all s′ ̸= s}
denote the set of pure strategy (symmetric) strict Nash equilibria of the game, and denote a typical
element of E by e. Further we denote by
BR(σ) = {s ∈ S|u(s,σ) ≥ u(s′,σ) for all s′ ̸= s}
the set of pure strategy best responses to a mixed strategy σ ∈ Σ.
As in Ellison’s (1993) model of local interactions we assume that our population is arranged around a
circle, so that a given agent i has agents i−1 and i+1 (mod m) as immediate neighbors (see Figure 1).
Each agent plays the game against his 2k closest neighbors (with k < m−1
2 ) in discrete time t = 0,1,2,....
We refer to k as the interaction radius. We denote by K(i) = {i−k,...,i−1,i+1,...,i+k} the set of
agents who interact with agent i and call this set the neighbors of agent i. If ω(t) = (s1,...,sm) is the

















Figure 1: The circular city model of local interaction.
2.2 Learning
Each period, with exogenous probability η ∈ (0,1) an agent might receive the opportunity to revise
her strategy.1 We assume that when such a revision opportunity arises she switches to a myopic best
response, i.e. she plays a best response to the distribution of play in her neighborhood in the previous
period. More formally, we consider a myopic best reply dynamics, where at time t + 1 player i chooses
si(t + 1) ∈ argmaxU (i,ω(t))
given the state ω(t) at t. If a player has several alternative best replies, we assume that she randomly
adopts one of them, assigning positive (exogenously given) probability to each. Further, with small
1I.e. we consider a model of positive inertia where agents may not adjust their strategy with certainty in each period.
We remark however that considering a model with no inertia ( = 1) will not qualitatively change our results.
3probability ϵ the agent ignores her prescription and chooses a strategy at random, i.e. she makes a
mistake or mutates.
The adjustment process described gives rise to a Markov process with state space Ω = Sm and
transition matrix P(ϵ), for which the standard techniques apply. In particular, we will be using Ellison’s
(2000) Radius–Coradius Theorem to identify the set of long run equilibria, corresponding to states in the
support of the limit invariant distribution as the mutation probability goes to zero.
2.3 Review of Techniques
We refer to the process without mistakes (ϵ = 0) as the unperturbed process and call the process with
mistakes (ϵ > 0) the perturbed process. Since P(ϵ) is strictly positive for ϵ > 0, the perturbed process
always has a unique strictly positive invariant distribution µ(ϵ) ∈ ∆(Ω).
The limit invariant distribution (as the rate of experimentations tends to zero) µ∗ = limϵ→0 µ(ϵ)
exists and is an invariant distribution of the unperturbed process (see e.g. Freidlin and Wentzell (1988),
Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), Young (1993), or Ellison (2000)). It singles out a stable prediction of
the original process, in the sense that, for any ϵ small enough, the play approximates that described by
µ∗ in the long run. The states in the support of µ∗, {ω ∈ Ω | µ∗(ω) > 0} are called Long Run Equilibria
(LRE) or stochastically stable states. Ellison (2000) presents a powerful method to determine the set of
LRE which is based on a characterization by Freidlin and Wentzell (1988). Let X and Y be two absorbing
sets of the unperturbed process and let c(X,Y ) > 0 be the minimal number of mistakes needed for a
direct transition from X to Y (i.e. the cost of transition). Deﬁne a path P of length ℓ(P) from X to Y
as a ﬁnite sequence of absorbing sets P = {X = S0,S1,...,Sℓ(P) = Y } and let S(X,Y ) be the set of all





The minimal number of mistakes required for a (possibly indirect) transition from X to Y is
C(X,Y ) = min
P∈S(X,Y )
c(P).
The Radius of an absorbing set X is deﬁned as
R(X) = min{C(X,Y )|Y is an absorbing set, Y ̸= X},
i.e. the minimal number of mistakes needed to leave X. The coradius of X is deﬁned as
CR(X) = max{C(Y,X)|Y is an absorbing set, Y ̸= X},
i.e. the maximal number of mistakes needed to reach X. Ellison (2000) shows that
Lemma 1. (Ellison 2000). If R(X) > CR(X) the only long run equilibria (LRE) are contained in X.
Note that R(X) > CR(X) simply expresses the idea that for X to be LRE X should be easier to
reach than to leave by simultaneous mutations.
3 Dominated strategies and local interactions
3.1 An example
In a ﬁrst step, we present an example proposed by Kim and Wong (2010) to illustrate their critique and











































Figure 2: Best response regions of the extended game ˜ G for large W.





We have two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, (A,A) and (B,B). Furthermore, B is a best response
whenever at least a fraction of 2
5 of the population adopts it. Hence, B is risk dominant in the sense of
Harsanyi and Selten (1988), i.e. it is a best response against a mixed strategy that assigns probability 1
2 to
both actions. In the setup of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) where each agent interacts with each other
agent in the population, for a suﬃciently large population, it takes approximately 2
5 of the population
to switch strategies to move from the convention
− →
A to the convention
− →
B. The opposite transition takes
approximately 3









B is LRE in a suﬃciently large population.
Kim and Wong add a third strategy to obtain the following extended game.
˜ G =
A B C
A 8,8 0,4 −W,−3W
B 4,0 6,6 −2W,−3W
C −3W,−W −3W,−2W −3W,−3W
Note that if W is chosen large enough we have that A is a best response whenever only one agent chooses
C. Figure 2 underscores this point by plotting the best response regions of the extended game. Hence,






A) = 1. For a large
enough population,
− →
A can however not be left with one mutation, establishing R(
− →
A) > 1.
Let us now consider the circular city model of local interactions and assume that each player only
interacts with her two closest neighbors, i.e. k = 1. As B is risk dominant each agent will have B as her
best response if one of her neighbors adopts it. Consider the convention
− →
A and assume that one agent
mutates to B:
...AABAA...
With positive probability the B-agent does not receive a revision opportunity whereas the boundary
A-agents receive a revision opportunity and we move to the state:
...ABBBA...
5Iterating this argument, we arrive at the risk dominant convention
− →
B. Thus, establishing that CR(
− →
A) =
1, in both the original game G and the extended game ˜ G.
In the original game G we have that any state where two adjacent players choose B lies in the basin
of
− →





B) > 1, whenever m ≥ 3.
Consider now the extended game ˜ G and the risk dominant convention
− →
B. Assume that one agent
mutates to C:
...BBCBB ...
With positive probability the C-player does not adjust her strategy whereas the B-players switch to A
and we reach the state
...BACAB ... → ...BAAAB ...
Unless, there is no or only one B-agent left, we will for sure move back to the risk dominant convention,
establishing that R(
− →
B) > 1, whenever m ≥ 5.
Thus, in the circular city model the selection of the risk dominant convention
− →
B remains for a
suﬃciently large population. In the following section, we will discuss this idea in more detail.
3.2 p-dominance and extended games
We ﬁrst introduce the concepts of p-dominance and extended games which will be key to our analysis.
Morris, Rob, and Shin (1995) deﬁne a strategy s to be p-dominant if s is the unique best response
against any mixed strategy σ such that σ(s) ≥ p. Note that in 2 × 2 games the concept of 1
2-dominance
coincides with Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) concept of risk dominance. Further note that a p-dominant
strategy is a strict Nash equilibrium whenever p < 1.
We adopt the following deﬁnition given by Kim and Wong (2010) to introduce the concept of an
extended game.
Definition 1. We say that a ﬁnite symmetric game ˜ G = (˜ S, ˜ u) extends another ﬁnite symmetric game
G = (S,u) if
(a) (Enlargement) S ⊆ ˜ S, and ˜ u|S×S = u
(b) (Dominance) ˜ u(˜ s,s) < ˜ u(s,s′) for all s ∈ S, all ˜ s ∈ ˜ S\S and all s′ ∈ ˜ S
That is an extended game ˜ G of a game G is obtained by adding strategies to the game G which are
all strictly dominated by all strategies of the original game. Consequently, the set of Nash equilibria
remains unaﬀected by the extension, i.e. ˜ E = E. Note however that if a strategy s∗ ∈ S is p-dominant
in the original game it need not be p-dominant in the extended game.
Kim and Wong (2010) have shown that for each equilibrium strategy e ∈ E of the original game G
there exists an extended game ˜ G with ˜ S = S ∪d such that BR(σ) = e for all σ ∈ Σ with σ(d) > x where
x can be chosen arbitrarily close to zero.
The basic idea behind this extension is the following. Strategy d earns a payoﬀ of −3W against all
strategies, strategy e earns a payoﬀ of −W against d, and all other strategies diﬀerent to e and s earn
a payoﬀ of −2W against d. So, by choosing W suﬃciently large e can be made a best response to any
mixed strategy that only puts a very small weight on d. Under global interactions this however implies
that one can always ﬁnd an extended game such that each agent will have e as a best response as soon
as only one of his interaction partners adopts d. Thus, to move into the basin of attraction of the state
where everybody chooses e one mutation is suﬃcient. This in turn implies that for each equilibrium
6strategy e of a game G one can ﬁnd an extended game ˜ G such that the long run prediction changes to e.
In the next section we will establish that this manipulation of the original game G might not necessarily
change the long run prediction.
3.3 Main results
In a ﬁrst step, as a benchmark scenario, we consider a game G with a 1
2-dominant strategy. This
essentially replicates the analysis of Ellison (1993, 2000) with the main diﬀerence that we have a model
with positive inertia whereas Ellison’s model features strategy adjustment in each round. Although the
proof essentially follows Ellison (1993, 2000) we report it here for the reader’s convenience.
Proposition 2. Suppose the game G has a 1
2-dominant strategy s∗. Then the state − → s ∗ is the unique
LRE provided that
m > (k + 1)2. (1)
Proof. First, observe that each agent will have s∗ as her best response as soon as at least k of her 2k
neighbors adopts it. Consider, now any absorbing state ω ̸= − → s . If there is a cluster of k adjacent s∗-
players, players at the boundary of this cluster will have s∗ as their best response and when given revision
opportunity will switch to s∗. In a next step, agents at the new boundary might receive revision oppor-
tunity and will also switch to s∗. In this manner the 1
2-dominant strategy will spread out contagiously
and we reach the convention − → s ∗, thus establishing that CR(− → s ∗) ≤ k.
Second, let us assess how diﬃcult it is to leave − → s ∗ by the mean of independent mutations. First, note
that if we have a cluster of k+1 adjacent s∗-players the dynamics will for sure move back to − → s ∗. For, (i)
each of the agents in the cluster has k neighbors choosing s∗ and thus will never switch, and (ii) agents
at the boundary of such a cluster will switch to s∗ whenever given revision opportunity.2 Hence, in order
to leave the basin of attraction of − → s ∗ we at least need one mutation per each k + 1 agents, establishing
R(− → s ∗) ≥ ⌈ m
k+1⌉.3 Thus, − → s ∗ is LRE if (1) holds.
Let us now consider an extended game ˜ G. It is important now that if the game G has a 1
2-dominant
strategy s∗ this strategy will not necessarily be 1
2-dominant in the extended game ˜ G. For instance,
in the introductory example B was 1
2-dominant in the original game but not in the extended game.
Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that if the original game has a 1
2 strategy under local interactions there does not
exist an extension that can reverse the long run prediction provided that the population size is large
compared to the interaction radius. This is the content of the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose the game G has a 1
2-dominant strategy s∗. Then the state − → s ∗ is the unique
LRE in any extended game ˜ G provided that
m > (k + 1)(3k + 1). (2)
Proof. In a ﬁrst step, recall that all strategies ˜ s ∈ ˜ S\S are strictly dominated by all strategies s ∈ S.
Thus, under our best response dynamic there can not be an absorbing state where some player chooses a
strategy ˜ s ∈ ˜ S\S. Now consider any state ω ̸= − → s ∗. As above, s∗ can spread out contagiously from any
cluster of adjacent s∗-players of at least size k, establishing CR(− → s ∗) ≤ k.
2Note that if there are less than k + 1 adjacent s agents those agents in the cluster have less than k of their neighbors
choosing s and thus when given revision opportunity may switch to some other strategy s ̸= s.
3Where ⌈x⌉ denotes the smallest integer larger than x.
7Now consider the 1
2-dominant convention − → s ∗ and assume that one agent mutates to a strategy ˜ s ∈
˜ S\S:
...s∗s∗ s∗ ...s∗
      
k
˜ ss∗ ...s∗
      
k
s∗s∗ ...
In the worst case, in the extended game each player will have some s ∈ S with s ̸= s′ as her best response
if only one of her 2k-neighbors chooses a strictly dominated strategy ˜ s ∈ ˜ S\S. Thus, it might be the
case that after only one mutation a cluster of 2k + 1 agents shifts to some other strategy s ∈ S. Note
that if after this event there is still a cluster of s∗-players of size k +1 left we will for sure go back to the
state − → s ∗. Hence, the most eﬃcient way to move out of the basin of attraction of − → s ∗ is by seeding one
mutation per 3k + 1 agents:
...s...s       
2k+1
s∗ ...s∗
      
<k+1
s...s       
2k+1
s∗ ...s∗
      
<k+1
...
This implies that we need at least ⌈ m
3k+1⌉ mutations to move out of the basin of attraction of − → s ∗,
establishing R(− → s ∗) ≥ ⌈ m
3k+1⌉. Hence, − → s ∗ is LRE in the extended game if (2) holds.
Proposition 3 implies that the selection of 1
2-dominant strategies remains in the circular city model
of local interaction in the extended game ˜ G provided that the population size is large relative to the
interaction radius. Thus, if the interaction structure is rather “decentral” the selection of 1
2- dominant
can not be reverted by adding dominated strategies. The main reason behind this result is that a 1
2-
dominant strategy may still spread out contagiously from an initially small subgroup in the extended
game. In other words, the number of mistakes to move into the 1
2-dominant convention is independent
of the population size. Conversely, the number of mistakes needed to upset the 1
2-dominant convention,
despite being increased in the extended game, still depends on the population size. Thus, for a suﬃciently
large population the ﬁrst eﬀect always dominates the second eﬀect and the 1
2-dominant convention will
be LRE.
It is interesting to note that the threshold for the extended game ˜ G identiﬁed in (2) is stronger than the
threshold for the original game G identiﬁed in (1). Thus, for smaller population sizes adding dominated
strategies might inﬂuence the long run prediction. We will study this issue in more detail in the next
proposition. Before that we will however introduce the following deﬁnition.
Definition 2. We deﬁne the p-potential of a strategy s to be smallest p for which s is p-dominant and
denote the p-potential of a strategy s by ps.
Note that all strict Nash equilibrium strategies of a game have a p-potential strictly smaller than one.
Further, note that if strategy s has a p-potential of ps no other strategy can have a p-potential smaller
than 1 − ps. For instance, in the introductionary example we had pA = 3
5 and pB = 2
5. We are now able
to state the following result.
Proposition 4. For each equilibrium strategy e ∈ E of a symmetric game G there exists an extended
game ˜ G with ˜ S = S ∪ d such that the state − → e is the unique LRE provided that
m < (2k − 2kpe − 1)(2k + 1). (3)
Proof. First, note that as (e,e) is a Nash equilibrium it follows that the state − → e is absorbing. Now,
consider any state ω ̸= − → e and assume that one agent mutates to d ∈ ˜ S\S.
...sss...s       
k
ds...s       
k
ss...
8As there exists an extended game in which e is a best response for any player who has only one of his
neighbors playing d. Thus, with positive probability all agents who interact with the d-player will switch
and the d-player will remain at her strategy and we reach the state.
...sse...e       
k
de...e       
k
ss...
When given revision opportunity the d-player will also switch to e, implying that with one mutation we
can directly shift 2k + 1 agents to e. Further, note that if there is one agent left playing some strategy
s ̸= e, then this player will always switch to e, as e is a strict Nash equilibrium. This implies that with
(at most) ⌈ m
2k+2⌉ mutations we can move into the state − → e , establishing CR(− → e ) ≤ ⌈ m
2k+2⌉.
Now consider the state − → e . As e has a p-potential of pe, a player will only switch to some other
strategy if more than ⌈2k(1 − pe)⌉ of her neighbors choose some strategies s ̸= e. Hence, to move out of
the basin of attraction of − → e we need more than ⌈2k(1 − pe)⌉ agents to mutate to some other strategy,
establishing R(− → e ) ≥ ⌈2k(1 − pe)⌉. Thus, if (3) holds − → e is LRE.
First, note that if pe > 1
2 the threshold (3) is weaker than the threshold (2), implying that Proposi-
tions 3 and 4 are consistent with each other. Let us now assess whether the threshold (3) identiﬁed in
Proposition 4 is compatible with a local interaction system, i.e. a situation where m > 2k+1 holds. This
translates into the condition
(2k − 2kpe − 1)(2k + 1) − 2k + 1 > 0.
Note that as pe < 1 one can always ﬁnd some k such that the previous inequality holds. Thus, for rather
“central” interaction structures one can indeed ﬁnd dominated strategies such that any equilibrium
strategy of the original game is the long run equilibrium in a local interaction model. We highlight our
results of Proposition 3 and 4 by plotting local interactions systems (i.e. interaction radii and population
sizes) under which the prediction of the introductionary example can be reversed and the local interaction
systems where this is never possible.










Figure 3: Equilibrium selection regions for the introductionary example ˜ G for suﬃciently large W. The
light gray region indicates local interaction systems where in light of Proposition 3 the selection of ⃗ B can
not be reversed. The dark grey region indicates local interaction systems where Proposition 4 bites and
⃗ A is selected. The black line represents the threshold for selection of ⃗ B in the original game G, identiﬁed
in Proposition 2. Thus, in the dark gray area above the black line the long run prediction is reversed in
the extended game.
94 Conclusion
The main reason why the local interaction model is robust to the critique by Kim and Wong (2010) (but
also why it has a high speed of convergence and its predictions are largely independent of the underlying
model of noise) is the fact that a 1
2-dominant strategy may spread out contagiously in the circular city
model. Thus, one might be able to show that this nice feature of the circular city model might carry
over to more general interaction structures if there is a strategy that is contagious in the sense of Morris
(2000).4 One might be tempted to use the nice properties of the local interaction model to defend results
of global interaction models. Note, however, that the examples in Ellison (1993) and Al´ os-Ferrer and
Weidenholzer (2007) demonstrate that local and global interactions models may display diﬀerent long
run predictions, once one moves beyond the class of 2×2 games. Thus, one has to be very cautious when
justifying the results of a global model by a local model.
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